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Foreword:                                                               
Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection 
Michael J. Kaufman*   
In this extraordinary issue of the Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal, the world’s leading scholars, jurists, and practitioners have 
provided profound articles at the intersection of “Behavioral Economics 
and Investor Protection.”  The articles emanate from a remarkable 
Conference held at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.1 
The Conference began with a keynote address by Professor Daniel 
Kahneman.  Professor Kahneman received the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences for integrating the insights from his psychological 
research into economic science.  His pathbreaking work, which is 
captured in his international best-selling book, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow,2 has animated the disciplines of behavioral science and behavioral 
economics. 
In his presentation at Loyola, Professor Kahneman explicated his 
research, which challenges the presumption that human behavior is the 
product of purely rational, cost-benefit decision-making.3  With his 
colleague Amos Tversky, Professor Kahneman discovered that most 
people do not actually make decisions that are consistent with 
 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and Director of the Institute for 
Investor Protection, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
1. The Conference, “Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection,” held on October 5, 
2012, was sponsored by the Loyola University Chicago Institute for Investor Protection and the 
Institute for Law and Economic Policy.  The Loyola University Chicago Institute for Investor 
Protection is a non-partisan, independent academic center that, through research, education and 
outreach, promotes investor protection and seeks to inform policy questions affecting securities 
fraud prohibitions and remedies.  The Institute for Law and Economic Policy is a public policy 
research and educational foundation established to preserve, study, and enhance access to the civil 
justice system by all consumers. 
2. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
3. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011) (arguing 
that the task of economics is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational 
maximizer of ends and seeks always to maximize wealth); GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978) (containing essays that purport to show that “all human 
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of 
preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets”). 
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maximizing their own expected utility.  He brilliantly created a “map of 
bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the 
beliefs that people have and the choices that they make from the optimal 
beliefs and choices assumed in rational agent models.”4  As Kahneman 
explained at Loyola: “We show that people are not adequately 
characterized as fully rational by a definition of rationality which is 
completely unrealistic.  This is the definition of rationality in standard 
decision theory . . . .”5 
According to Kahneman, the choices that individuals make are 
narrowly bounded by their contexts, frames, or environments.  Humans 
are prone to many cognitive biases or heuristics that distort their 
judgment.  These heuristics produce context-driven decisions that 
cannot be fully explained by classical models of pure rational choice or 
subjective utility.6  For instance, individuals display a bias toward loss 
aversion; they feel the pain of a loss much more acutely than the 
pleasure of an equivalent gain.  As such, their decisions reflect a “status 
quo bias” and “an endowment effect”—they tend to over-value what 
they have and refrain from making many value-maximizing 
transactions.  Contrary to the model of the rational decision-maker, 
Professor Kahneman proved that the objects of choice are assessed by 
individuals through an all too human, emotional, and intuitive 
psychological process. 
As Kahneman emphasized in his Loyola address, and as he details in 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, the complexity of human thought and action 
can be understood by envisioning two systems operating simultaneously 
in the brain.  System 1 drives the brain’s first response; it is the mind’s 
quick, automatic, intuitive, and mostly unconscious associative response 
to stimuli.  System 2 is the slow, deliberate, conscious, calculating, 
analytical, laborious, and seemingly rational mode of cognition. The 
rapid judgments and reactions directed by System 1 are indispensable to 
human survival; but they are also influenced by biases and mistakes.  
System 1 generates an effortless response to a choice. Yet, when an 
appropriate response is not readily accessible, System 1 produces a 
response to a different choice, one that is only “associatively” related to 
 
4. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003). 
5. Daniel Kahneman, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Keynote Address, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1333, 1333 (2013) [hereinafter Kahneman, Keynote Address].  See also Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (critiquing expected utility theory and proposing prospect theory as 
an alternative). 
6. See Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and 
Assessment, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 172 (2013). 
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the actual choice presented.7  In his Loyola remarks, Kahneman also 
described the results of many of his experiments and observations, 
which demonstrate that the rapid associations and intuitions produced 
by System 1 usually overwhelm and therefore skew the supposed 
objective deliberations of System 2.  As a consequence, individual 
choices are more likely to reflect predictable biases than purely rational 
calculations. 
After presenting his insights, Professor Kahneman challenged the 
Conference participants to consider the implications of his research for 
the proper development of the law and policy governing investor 
protection.  He contended that because people are “limited” by 
cognitive biases and heuristics, they “need more protection than they 
would in the standard rational model.”8  In particular, they need legal 
protection from “their own mistakes” and from the many “legal, but 
predatory actions in the market [that] exploit the laziness of System 2.”9 
Moreover, Kahneman stressed that any legal structure designed to 
influence behavior should be targeted at “System 1 responses” that 
humans tend to make when faced with important choices.  Kahneman 
praised the work of his colleagues, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, 
who have built on his research to demonstrate that policy-makers can 
and should “nudge” individuals toward desirable decisions by shaping 
the architecture in which their choices are made.10 
Despite Kahneman’s transformative research, however, the 
presumption that individuals are rational utility-maximizers still 
permeates the law and policy governing the protection of investors from 
securities fraud.  Investors who pursue remedies under the primary anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its attendant Rule 10b-5,11 must 
 
7. In his keynote address at the Conference, and in his life’s work, Professor Kahneman offers 
compelling examples of how “associative processes” dictate major biases in human judgment and 
choice.  See Kahneman, Keynote Address, supra note 5, at 1334–38.  See also Carey K. 
Morewedge & Daniel Kahneman, Associative Processes in Intuitive Judgment, 14 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCIS. 435 (2010). 
8. Kahneman, Keynote Address, supra note 5, at 1330. 
9. Id.  
10. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2000) (providing lessons for structuring social policies so 
that citizens still have control over their actions, but are gently “nudged” to act in their own best 
interests); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011) 
(“A general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives can have large and highly 
beneficial effects”). 
11. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), was promulgated by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission pursuant to its authority under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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plead and prove: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation 
or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.”12 
In shaping each of these essential elements of a securities fraud 
claim, the courts have been heavily influenced by the rational choice 
model of human and market behavior.  For example, based on their 
presumption that corporate officers would not rationally choose to 
deceive investors, the courts have been reluctant to find that allegations 
in a securities fraud complaint are sufficient to create a “strong 
inference” of scienter.13  Similarly, the judicial creation of an 
“objective” definition of “materiality,” and the judicial endorsement of 
the “fraud-on-the market” theory of reliance, are based on the 
presumption that investors’ decisions to buy or sell securities usually 
reflect rational, unbiased responses to new information.14  Standards for 
 
12. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (quoting 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)). 
13. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, plaintiffs must “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006).  The required state of mind is scienter, which is 
recklessness or intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 193 n.12 (1976).  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court held 
that a securities fraud complaint will survive dismissal only if “a reasonable person would deem 
the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could 
draw from the facts alleged.”  551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).  Courts thus must “take into account 
plausible opposing inferences” in determining whether the defendant acted with the requisite 
intent.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324 (2011).   
 As part of this weighing process, federal courts have presumed that fraud is economically 
irrational, and thus pleading scienter has become “exceedingly difficult.”  See Reiger v. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A] large independent 
accounting will rarely, if ever, have any rational economic incentive to participate in the client’s 
fraud.”).  See also Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding it 
“improbable” that the defendant, Inspire, would tout a drug that it thought “was doomed for 
failure”); Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1035 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(finding it “unthinkable” that the defendant would choose to deceive investors); DiLeo v. Ernst & 
Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that it would be “irrational” for an accountant 
to engage in securities fraud); In re First Chi. Corp. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (“[W]here the fraud is shown to be irrational behavior, the circumstantial evidence must be 
stronger . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
14. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1196 (“[The] ‘question of materiality . . . is an objective one, 
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.’” 
(quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 US 438, 445 (1976))).  In Amgen, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance, which it had “endorsed” in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 405 U.S. 224 (1988), and in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co., 
131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).  The Amgen Court also found congressional support for that presumption. 
Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1200–01.  According to the Court, the “fraud-on-the-market premise is that 
the price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information 
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establishing the elements of loss causation and damages in securities 
fraud cases through an expert’s “event study”15 also are guided by the 
assumption that investors react to the disclosure of concealed 
information by entering predictably rational transactions that result in 
efficient market price movements.16  Indeed, the judicial presumption of 
rational choice informs virtually every element of a securities fraud 
claim. 
Yet, as Professor Kahneman’s work proves, that presumption cannot 
be fully justified as a mechanism for explaining, predicting, or judging 
actual human behavior.  How should the law respond when its 
fundamental premises have been challenged?  In particular, how should 
the law and policy governing securities fraud evolve to incorporate the 
overwhelming evidence of the actual behavior of investors?  Each of the 
authors herein has taken on that critically important question. 
 
*** 
United States Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner begins by 
providing a fascinating perspective on the “profound effect” that 
Professor Kahneman’s research has had on law and economics.  Judge 
Posner is one of our most influential jurists and legal scholars.17  He has 
 
about a company; accordingly, a buyer of the security may be presumed to have relied on that 
information in purchasing the security.”  Id. at 1190.  The Court also observed that it is 
“reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little hope of outperforming 
the market in the long run based solely on their analysis of publicly available information—will 
rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all 
public information.”  Id. at 1192. 
15. Dunbar and Sen describe event studies as follows: 
The typical approach to estimating damages in a securities-fraud case involves 
performing an event study to determine both the materiality of the allegedly misleading 
information and the magnitude of the losses caused by the alleged fraud.  Because of 
its wide acceptability, standards governing its operation, known rate of error, and 
ability to test hypotheses, the event-study technique provides a good example of 
scientific evidence. 
Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in 
Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199, 230. 
16. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension Fund, 579 
F.3d 401, 409–10 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that an expert’s event study measures precise 
market price response to the disclosure of concealed information necessary to prove loss 
causation and damages); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(requiring an event study showing price movement in response to disclosure of concealed 
information to avoid summary judgment).  See also Michael J. Kaufman and John M. 
Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 208–19 (2009) (documenting the increasing judicial 
recognition of the necessity of proving securities fraud elements through event studies that are 
predicated on rational investor choices in response to new information). 
17. See David Campbell, Welfare Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Consequences of 
Judge Posner, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2233, 2234 (2012) (“Richard Posner [has] ‘clearly played 
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authored more than forty books and countless articles, many of which 
apply economic analysis to matters of law and policy.18  In his article, 
Behavioral Finance before Kahneman,19 Judge Posner places Professor 
Kahnemen’s work within a strong tradition of criticism of the model of 
man as a “rational maximizer.”  According to Judge Posner, the 
discipline of “behavioral finance” challenges that model based on 
evidence that the irrational biases of investors are “systematic” and 
“pervasive.”  Contrary to the proponents of the “efficient-market theory, 
which posits rationality,” Judge Posner recognizes that “investor 
irrationalities persist and cause systematic deviations between stock 
price and fundamental value.”20  In fact, “irrational investor behavior” 
is actually “promoted” by “securities professionals who see profit 
opportunities in exploiting that behavior.”21  Judge Posner concludes by 
exploring the limits of rational choice in fully explaining the 
psychological influences that generate bubbles and bursts, including the 
fear of the unknown which causes investors to freeze in the face of 
negative uncertainty. 
In his article, titled Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory,22 
Professor Russell Korobkin, of the UCLA School of Law, next 
demonstrates how Kahneman’s research has inspired scores of legal 
scholars—working in virtually every area of the law—to examine how 
the law can best be used to “(1) promote the efficient allocation of 
resources . . . , (2) encourage certain socially desirable conduct . . . , and 
(3) help individuals fulfill their potential . . . .”23  Professor Korobkin 
concludes that behavioral law and economics is the “future of legal 
policy analysis.” 
Thomas Ulen, the Swanlund Chair and Professor of Law Emeritus at 
the University of Illinois Law School, also offers a persuasive analysis 
of the broad influence of behavioral science on the development of legal 
doctrine.  In A Behavioral View of Investor Protection,24 Professor Ulen 
 
the major role’ in the development of law and economics.” (quoting R.H. Coase, Law and 
Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 251 (1993))); Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s 
Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 383 (1986) (describing Judge 
Posner as the “most prolific and most cited law and economics scholar”).  
18. For a sample of Judge Posner’s publications, see Campbell, supra note 17, at 2233 n.1, 
2236 nn.9–10, 2241 n.43. 
19. Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Finance before Kahneman, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1341 
(2013).  
20. Id. at 1343. 
21. Id. 
22. Russell Korobkin, Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1349 (2013).  
23. Id. at 1353. 
24. Thomas S. Ulen, A Behavioral View of Investor Protection, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1357 
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shares Professor Korobkin’s appreciation for Kahneman’s work and its 
influence on the recent path of the law in a wide variety of areas.  He 
recalls how Kahneman’s work gave him an “epiphany” that led him to 
rethink all of his prior work in law and economics, which was based on 
“rational choice theory.”  Professor Ulen then carefully applies the 
insights of behavioral economics to the precise issue of investor 
protection, and advocates augmented disclosure obligations, financial 
literacy training, and additional randomized controlled trials to test 
“behaviorally inspired policies.” 
Professors Charles Murdock and Barry Sullivan from the Loyola 
University of Chicago School of Law then glean from Daniel 
Kahneman’s work tremendous insights for lawyers, particularly those 
engaged in the art of advocacy.  Entitled What Kahneman Means for 
Lawyers: Some Reflections on Thinking, First and Slow,25 their essay 
offers strategies for practicing attorneys, including: “framing” the 
“right” questions in preparing witnesses for trial; “priming” fact-finders 
by using associative language; “anchoring” settlement negotiations and 
calculations; appealing to human intuition by fashioning a coherent trial 
story; appreciating the role of stereotypes, first impressions, and 
confirmatory bias in the decisions of adjudicators; and even 
understanding the disposition toward overconfidence and loss aversion 
in negotiating transactions.  Professors Murdock and Sullivan conclude 
that an understanding of Kahneman’s work is “indispensable” to any 
attorney wishing to perfect their advocacy and persuasion skills. 
In Building On Kahneman’s Insights in the Development of 
Behavioral Finance,26 Professor Hersh Shefrin—one of the founders of 
behavioral finance—describes how the work of Kahneman and Tversky 
“dramatically influenced” his own research, particularly his discoveries 
of the disposition effect, market risk aversion, return biases over time, 
and the planning fallacy.  Professor Shefrin insightfully applies each of 
these concepts to the fraud-on-the-market theory, the fiduciary 
responsibilities of financial advisors, and the recklessness standard in 
securities fraud cases.  As he demonstrates, the “behavioral perspective 
stemming from Kahneman’s insights raises critical issues for the theory 
and practice of law”27 in securities fraud regulation and litigation. 
The next series of articles applies the insights of behavioral 
 
(2013).   
25. Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some 
Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377 (2013). 
26. Hersh Shefrin, Building On Kahneman’s Insights in the Development of Behavioral 
Finance, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1401 (2013). 
27. Id. at 1420. 
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economics to the requirement that victims of securities fraud seeking a 
remedy for their losses must plead and prove that the defendant acted 
with scienter.  In her compelling essay, Behavioral Science and Scienter 
in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation,28 Professor Ann Morales 
Olazábal explains the implications of Kahneman’s “groundbreaking” 
work for proof of scienter and contends that “since cognitive illusions, 
mental heuristics, and other psychological effects inevitably bias issuer 
disclosure, a level of scienter closer to gross negligence (or even 
negligence) may be the key to achieving an appropriate level of 
deterrent effect via the law.”29 
In Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral 
Culpability,30 however, Judge Jed Rakoff of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York cautions that in his 
experience, judges and juries have very little difficulty in “actually 
determining when someone has acted intentionally in undertaking a 
fraud.”31 Although he appreciates that purely negligent behavior can 
cause great harm, Judge Rakoff contends that financial liability should 
be imposed only if the defendant’s recklessness includes the “moral 
culpability” that stems from “consciously” turning away from what was 
“incredibly risky.” 
In their essay, The Dangers of Missing the Forest: The Harm Caused 
By VeriFone Holdings in a Tellabs World,32 leading securities litigators 
Carol Gilden and Michael Eisenkraft of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll 
PLLC, and Harvard Law School graduate Josh Segal, apply the lessons 
of behavioral economics to the issue of whether a securities fraud 
complaint has met the Supreme Court’s requirement of pleading a 
“strong inference” of scienter.  Gilden et al. show that the Supreme 
Court’s “holistic” approach, which requires that allegations of scienter 
be considered “collectively,” is consistent with Kahneman’s insight that 
human behavior cannot be understood in the absence of its context.  
Nonetheless, as their essay shows, some influential federal courts still 
are failing to rigidly follow the holistic approach, thereby disregarding 
the Supreme Court’s precedent and the realities of human behavior. 
In the concluding set of articles, the authors turn to the relationship 
 
28. Ann Morales Olazábal, Behavioral Science and Scienter in Class Action Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1423 (2013).   
29. Id. at 1441. 
30. Jed S. Rakoff, Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral Culpability, 
44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1447 (2013). 
31. Id. at 1449. 
32. Carol Gilden, Michael B. Eisenkraft & Josh Segal, The Dangers of Missing the Forest: 
The Harm Caused By VeriFone Holdings in a Tellabs World, 44. LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1457 (2013).  
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between behavioral economics and the essential elements of materiality, 
reliance, and causation in securities fraud litigation.  In his thought-
provoking essay, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: 
Amgen’s Missed Opportunity,33 Geoffrey Rapp, the Harold A. 
Anderson Professor of Law and Values at the University of Toledo 
College of Law, argues that the insights of behavioral psychology and 
experiential economics require that key elements of securities fraud 
liability be “jettisoned (or at least fundamentally rethought).”34 He 
contends that the judicial interpretations of materiality, an efficient 
market, reliance, and even scienter are based on unsupportable fictions.  
Accordingly, they should be eliminated, and replaced by a standard of 
liability modeled on state consumer fraud statutes, which create modest 
damages remedies for any false statement made in connection with a 
securities transaction. 
In her article, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: 
Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets,35 Barbara Black, the Charles 
Hartsock Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati College of 
Law, then carefully demonstrates that some courts have exploited the 
insights from behavioral economics to frustrate investor protection, 
actually making it more difficult for investors to pursue class-wide 
relief based on the theory of fraud on an efficient market.  Professor 
Black astutely shows that research from behavioral economics 
“supports the need for (at least some) paternalistic responses to 
cognitive biases,”36 including investor protection measures that go 
beyond existing disclosure obligations. 
Finally, in his comprehensive article, Behavioral Economics Applied: 
Loss Causation,37 Professor Robert Prentice, of the McCombs School of 
Business at the University of Texas at Austin, tackles the critical issue 
of loss causation in securities fraud litigation.  He first suggests that 
proving loss causation in securities fraud cases is justifiably difficult 
because judgments about causation are infused with cognitive biases 
that lead adjudicators to tend to find causation where it might not exist.  
Yet, Professor Prentice also draws on the insights of behavioral science 
to show that jurors tend to have a cognitive bias against the alleged 
 
33. Geoffrey Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: Amgen’s Missed 
Opportunity, 44. LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475 (2013).  
34. Id. at 1479. 
35. Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, 
Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493 (2013).  
36. Id. at 1507. 
37. Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Economics Applied: Loss Causation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1509 (2013).   
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victims of securities fraud.  Moreover, he observes that contemporary 
judicial assessments about the causal link between securities fraud and 
economic harm are “bounded” by relatively conservative judicial pre-
dispositions. Professor Prentice ultimately questions the judicial 
system’s confidence in the ability of judges and jurors to adjudicate the 
issue of loss causation in complicated securities fraud cases. 
Like each of the authors in this special issue of the Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal, Professor Prentice understands that Kahneman’s 
pioneering work demands a serious re-examination of the fundamental 
principles and assumptions underlying the existing regime of securities 
fraud regulation and litigation.  In the articles that follow, the authors 
not only conduct that re-examination, they also provide great guidance 
for all scholars, judges, practitioners, and policy-makers engaged in the 
law, policy, and practice of investor protection. 
 
